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Recent Cases
CONTRACTS-COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE-ACTIVITIES
PROHIBITED
Wineteer v. Kite'
Vendors sold the only supermarket in Glasgow, Missouri (population 1,200),
and agreed not to compete directly or indirectly with vendees for the ensuing ten
years. A year later the vendors purchased land two blocks outside of Glasgow
and began grading the land for the construction of a shopping center that would
house a supermarket. Upon objection by the vendees, the vendors sought a declara-
tory judgement to determine whether their covenant would preclude their building
and leasing a supermarket for a percentage of the gross receipts of the business as
conducted solely by a future lessee. The trial court held the covenant inapplicable
and the Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed.2
Whether a vendor's activity constitutes a breach of his covenant not to com-
pete is basically a question of contractual interpretation. However, when the
covenant is ambiguous and capable of two different interpretations the courts re-
ly upon rules of construction in their attempt to find the intent of the parties. In
such cases a court may properly consider the entire instrument, its subject mat-
ter, the motives that led to the agreement, the circumstances which surrounded its
execution, and the objectives intended to be effected by it.a In other words, in
construing ambiguous covenants, the purpose to be achieved and spirit of the
agreement control instead of the strict meaning of the terms of the agreement.4
Since the purpose of most covenants not to compete is the protection of the
thing sold to the vendee,5 a test which looks to the injurious effect of the vendor's
activity on the business sold has been used by most courts to determine whether
the vendor has breached his agreement.0 This test has been aptly called a "mis-
chief test" by an Iowa court which stated the rule as follows:
1. 397 S.W.2d 752 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
2. Id. at 760.
3. Tull v. Turek, 147 A.2d 658 (Del. 1958); Dannel v. Sherman Transfer Co.,
211 S.W. 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
4. Caldwell-Clements, Inc., v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d 482, 197
Misc. 691 (1949), af'd, 277 App. Div. 767, 97 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1950).
5. Tull v. Turek, supra note 3; Laszlo v. Terao, 343 Ill. App. 467, 99 N.E.2d
370 (1951); Davis v. Barney, 2 Gill & J. 382 (Md. 1830); Amsterdam v. Marmor,
125 Misc. 865, 212 N.Y. Supp. 300 (1925).
6. Alcock v. Alcock, 267 Ill. 422, 108 N.E. 671 (1915); Wilson v. Delaney,
137 Iowa 636, 113 N.W. 842 (1907); Ammon v. Keill, 95 Neb. 695, 146 N.W.
1009 (1914); see Annot. 93 A.L.R. 121, 122 (1934) and cases cited therein.
(548)
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The test, as we conceive, is mischief. And mischief begins when the scope
and character of the employment is such as to result in all likelihood in
substantial interference with the business which was the subject of the con-
tract .... Influence may be exerted indirectly as well as directly, and the
purchaser of a business and its good will is entitled not only to protection
in respect of customers then patrons, but to enter the field of competition
unhampered by any adverse influence of the seller.
Thus, in Langberg v. Wagner,8 a vendor of a window washing business was re-
strained from working as a window washer for a competing window washing busi--
ness because his employment might cause established customers of the business
sold to transfer their patronage to the competing business.
However, most courts seem to have limited the application of the "mischief
test" to ambiguous covenants with respect to which the vendor has actually been
employed or engaged in a competing business as an active participant. Thus, where
the vendor has been employed as an inferior servant,9 has been employed as a
manager,10 or has participated by advising and assisting another in establishing
a competing business,11 and where damage was likely to flow from the assistance,
a breach has been established. Where the relationship between the vendor and
competitor was that of vendor-vendee,' 2 lessor-lessee,' 8  grantor-grantee, 14 or
creditor-debtor,' 8 the test has not been applied. Where there was no active par-
ticipation, the courts, rather than relying on any particular test, have based their
decisions on an interpretation of the specific provisions of the covenant.' 6 This
approach normally leads to a holding for the vendor.' 7
The reason seems to be that such activity is so remote from and so slightly
connected with the business which generates the competition as not to be within
the scope of the prohibition. Thus, one legal writer' 8 has stated, in criticising
Hartison v. Cook,19 which restrained a vendor from loaning money to his vendee's
competitor, that "[ilf courts may imply a further obligation by the seller to re-
frain from even a tenuous connection with a competitor, the buyer gets more than
he bargained for, while the seller inadvertently gives up important rights he never
contemplated parting with."20 Other authorities have suggested that there can
7. Wilson v. Delaney, supra note 6, at 641, 113 N.W. at 844.
8. 101 N.J. Eq. 383, 139 Adt. 518 (1927).
9. Ibid.
10. Smith v. Webb, 176 Ala. 596, 58 So. 913 (1912); see Annot. 93 A.L.R. 121,
127 (1934) and cases cited therein.
11. Amsterdam v. Marmor, supra note 5.
12. Reeves v. Sprague, 114 N.C. 647, 19 S.E. 707 (1894).
13. Ericson v. Jayette, 149 Fla. 82, 5 So. 2d 453 (1941).
14. Simmons v. Johnson, 11 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 1942).
15. Slate Co. v. Bikash, 343 Mass. 172, 177 N.E.2d 780 (1961); Salzman v.
Siegelman, 102 App. Div. 406, 92 N.Y. Supp. 844 (1905).
16. Supra notes 12-15.
17. Ibid.
18. Fleischer, Noncoinpetition Covenants: An Unexpected Interpretation, 4
SANTA CLARA LAW. 110 (1963).
19. 213 Cal. App. 2d 527, 29 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1963).
20. Supra note 18, at 124.
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never be a breach of a covenant not to compete unless the conduct of the vendor
amounts to an active participation in the running of the competitive business, or
unless the non-participating activity is expressly prohibited in the covenant.21
Such suggestions stem from a number of decisions that have interpreted standard
non-competition covenants22 as not prohibiting vendor activities that consist solely
of the lending of money,23 the furnishing of goods,24 the extending of credit,25
the selling of buildings and land,26 and the leasing of buildings to a competitor of
the vendee.
This is the conclusion Missouri seems to have reached in the noted case. The
Kansas City Court of Appeals stated that the vendors do not breach their covenant
not to compete as long as they "... refrain from disparaging the good will of their
vendees by any act or conduct amounting to an active participation in the opera-
tion or management of the competitive business .... -"2 The court did not precisely
define "active participation," but said that it is ". . . as defined by the terms of
(the opinion of the noted case] and by the law generally." 28 From this one may
hazard a guess that an active participation will be established if the vendor's par-
ticipation in the competing business consists of: (1) engaging in the business as a
partner or principal or as an inferior servant creating an injurious effect; (2)
conducting or controling the business as a manager; (3) assisting while owning
a proprietary interest in the business; (4) actively encouraging the business by
performing substantial service for it; (5) organizing a competing corporation. Ac-
cordingly, since building and leasing for a percent of gross receipts does not con-
stitute such an active participation, the court held that, as a matter of law, this
activity should not be prohibited 29
However, at least three jurisdictions have found a breach of a general covenant
not to compete when the activity of the vendor has not amounted to an active
participation in the competitive business. In Davis v. Barney,30 the Maryland
court held that a vendor of a line of stagecoaches, who covenanted not to be con-
21. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 327(4), p. 278 (1963); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 1333,
1336 (1950).
22. Agreements not to keep a similar business either directly or indirectly,
Hebert v. Dupaty, 42 La. Ann. 343, 7 So. 580 (1890); not to directly or indirectly
enter into a competing business, Simmons v. Johnson, supra note 14; not to com-
pete or do anything to prejudice the good will sold, Slate Co. v. Bikash, supra
note 15; not to engage directly or indirectly in the same business, Nelson v. John-
son, 38 Minn. 255, 36 N.W. 868 (1888), Harkinson's Appeal, 78 Pa. 196 (1875);
not to compete directly or indirectly, Wineteer v. Kite, supra note 1; not to en-
gage in any way in a competitive business, Gallup Electric Light Co. v. Pacific
Improvement Co., 16 N.M. 86, 113 Pac. 848 (1911); not to engage in a drug
business, supra note 12.
23. Gallup Electric Light Co. v. Pacific Improvement Co., supra note 22;
Harkinson's Appeal, supra note 22.
24. Supra note 12.
25. Slate Co. v. Bikash, supra note 15.
26. Hebert v. Dupaty, supra note 22.
27. Wineteer v. Kite, supra note 1, at 759.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Suwra note 5.
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cerned, directly or indirectly, in any competing line of stages, would breach his
covenant by furnishing competitors with money, credit, or other means for the
purpose of enabling them to carry on or better carry on the competing business.3'
California has enjoined non-participating activities such as leasing and lending in
the decisions of Harrison v. Cook3 2 and Dowd v. Bryce.s3 In Harrison, a vendor
was held to have breached his covenant not to establish, conduct, or lend his
name to a competing business when his loan to his son enabled the son to estab-
lish a competing business and drive the vendee into bankruptcy. 4 The Dowd
court stated that a vendor's lease of other property to a competitor would con-
stitute indirect competition3 5 In J. D. Nichols Stores v. Lipschiutz,36 which quotes
the Dowd opinion at length, the Ohio court held that a vendor's letting of a cloth-
ing shop was prohibited by his covenant not to directly or indirectly interfere in
any manner with the business sold.3 7
In construing these covenants broadly so as to bring non-participating activity
within the scope of the prohibition, the three jurisdictions mentioned above seem
to have felt that, in the absence of any express language to the contrary, the
essential purpose of the standard agreement not to compete is to keep the vendor
from doing anything that will tend to prejudice the business sold, whether that
activity be a participating or a non-participating one. The Dowd case implies that
it makes no difference how the vendor brings about the injurious effect on the
vendee's business. Since he controls the opportunity to compete, he creates just as
much competition by leasing to a prospective competitor as he would by going
into the business himself.38 The most straightforward, but perhaps unorthodox, ex-
pression of these views is stated in the Harrison case wherein the court admitted
there was no technical breach of the covenant but asserted that the breach should
be established on the basis of the vendor's violation of an implied covenant not
to do anything that would deprive the other party of the benefits of the con-
tract.39 The effect of these decisions is to extend the "mischief test" to all cases,
with less emphasis being given to the particular language of the covenant.
To find a breach of the covenant in the Wineteer case it would be necessary
for a court to find that the purpose of the covenant not to compete directly or
indirectly was to keep the vendor from doing anything to harm the good will sold,
either by directly utilizing his knowledge and experience in that type of business
to run a competing business himself, or by indirectly using thrat knowledge and ex-
perience to his advantage by profitably employing or enabling another to achieve
the same result. Had the Maryland, California or Ohio courts construed this cov-
enant, such a purpose probably would have been found on the ground that the
31. Id. at 403.
32. Supra note 19.
33. 95 Cal. App. 2d 644, 213 P.2d 500 (1950).
34. Supra note 32, at 531, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
35. Supra note 33, at 647, 213 P.2d at 501.
36. 120 Ohio App. 286, 201 N.E.2d 898 (1963).
37. Id. at 293, 201 N.E.2d at 903.
38. Dowd v. Bryce, supra note 33, at 647, 213 P.2d at 501-502.
39. Harrison v. Cook, supra note 32, at 530, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
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terms, spirit, and very nature of the agreement imply it. Furthermore, because
Mr. Wineteer's building and leasing of a second supermarket in a town the size
of Glasgow would have the effect of defeating that purpose by enabling the lessee
to encroach seriously upon the market sold to Mr. Kite, and because Mr. Wineteer
obviously recognized and desired that effect, these courts probably would have is-
sued the injunction. However, the court in the noted case construed the covenant
to mean that the vendor was to not generally engage in a competitive business 4 0
It rejected any possibility of an extension of the mischief philosophy to non-par-
ticipating activities, and instead seems to have arbitrarily established active partici-
pation as the limit beyond which a vendor cannot be restrained unless the covenant
expressly prohibits the particular non-participating activity.41 Even though the
vendor would make possible the destruction of the vendee's business, the court
disallowed the injunction because he would not actively participate in the subse-
quent destructive process. This distinction permits a less desirable result since it
tends to ignore the spirit and purpose of the contract.
In reaching its decision the court expressly rejected the Dowd and Nichols
reasoning.42 It relied on authority that requires a positive expression before de-
creeing a restraint against non-participating activities.48 It failed to distinguish
the Nichols covenant which prohibited indirect interference in any manner4 4 from
the Wineteer covenant which merely prohibited indirect competition, and it men-
tioned the fact that the Wineteer covenant did not contain an express restriction
against leasing.45 All of these factors suggest that if a buyer desires full protection
against the possibly damaging activities of his seller, he must include in the cov-
enant an express prohibition against activities that amount to something less than
an active participation. Prospective vendees should be put on guard by the de-
cision and perhaps make an inquiry into the past and prospective business deal-
ings of their vendor. An investigation may disclose a need to include in the con-
tract an express covenant against leasing, financing, supplying, or otherwise in-
directly assisting.
JOHN H. CALVeRT
40. Supra note 1, at 755.
41. Id. at 759.
42. Ibid.
43. Houston Transfer and Carriage Co. v. Williams, 201 S.W. 712 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1917), 221 S.W. 1081, 1082 (Tex. Com. App. 1920).
44. J. D. Nichols Stores v. Lipschutz, supra note 36.
45. Wineteer v. Kite, supra note 1, at 755.
[Vol. 31
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PATENTABILITY-THE TEST OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS-
SECTION 103 OF THE PATENT ACT
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City1
Since 1952, when Congress revised the Patent Act,2 district and appeals court
decisions and articles have been written concerning the effect of section 103s on
the standard of patentability. The Supreme Court had denied certiorari in cases
where section 103 was in issue.4 In the principal case, the Court not only answers
many of the basic questions on this section, but also clarifies some previous de-
cisions on patentability.0
The decision includes three cases0 having the same basic issue. Since each
patent case depends upon its own facts and the "ultimate question of patent va-
lidity is one of law,' 7 this note will deal only with the legal aspects.
The decision of the Court may best be understood if a brief history of patent-
ability is given first. The first Patent Act, passed in 1790, stated that a patent
should be granted to anyone who "hath .. .invented or discovered any useful art,
manufacture, . . . or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used."0
This act was superseded February 21, 1793, by a second Patent Act.10 It pro-
vided that any person who "invented any new and useful art" and who met the
formal requirements as to filing and disclosure, could obtain a patent.11
The Patent Act of 183612 reintroduced "invented or discovered," which had
1. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
2. This is now codified in Title 35, United States Code.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952) which reads as follows:
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject natter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
4. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 911 (1955).
5. 383 U.S. at 19.
6. The case named in the citation involved the validity of a patent on a
"Clamp for vibrating Shank Plows." The Supreme Court granted certiorari after
the patent had been held valid by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and invalid
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The other two suits were Calmar, Inc. v.
Cook Chemical Co. and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. These were
on the question of validity of a single patent. The subject matter of the patent
was a finger-operated sprayer with a "hold-down" cap. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals held this patent valid. The Supreme Court holds that both patents are
invalid due to the "obviousness" of the subject matter in view of the prior art.
7. 383 U.S. at 17.
8. 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
9. This particular wording of the section is found at 383 U.S. at 7.
10. 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
11. Certain provisions on disclosure are now found in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952).
12. 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
1966]
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been dropped in the 1793 Act. The 1836 Act also retained the requirement that in-
ventions or discoveries must be "new and useful." Although Congress changed the
Patent Act many times, the basic requirements of novelty and utility remained the
sole statutory basis for patentability until 1952.13
In the 1853 case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,14 the Supreme Court added the
requirement of "invention." Since Hotchkiss, many opinions have been rendered
on the meaning of "invention," including several by the Supreme Court.
As time passed, it became questionable whether the standard of patentability
was remaining the same. Some courts thought the Supreme Court was moving
toward a stricter standard.15 In the Reviser's Note, which accompanied the 1952
Act, Mr. P. J. Federico stated:i
[Slome modification was intended in the direction of moderating the ex-
treme degrees of strictness exhibited by a number of judicial opinions
over the past dozen or more years .... 16
In 1952, Congress passed the new Patent Act, which added "non-obviousness"
as a new statutory requirement for patentability. The Senate and House reports
stated:
Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which
exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by rea-
sons of decisions of the courts.17
There was little doubt by most courts that this new section codified the case
law.' 8 The question then became, which law was codified? Was it the old law
which the Court announced in Hotch kiss, or the new, stricter standard which many
said had been advanced in recent decisions? The district and appeals courts were
split in their opinions.
In 1955, Judge Learned Hand wrote, in Lyon v. Bausch, & Lomb Optical Co.,19
that the standard for patentability had been raised in the few years prior to 1952
by the decisions of the Supreme Court. He then found the new act lowered the
standard and returned it to that of Hotchkiss. Several cases have followed this rea-
13. In 1952 the test of "non-obviousness" was added. An invention must still
meet the requirements of novelty and utility before a patent will be issued. These
requirements are found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1952).
14. 52 U.S. 248 (1853).
15. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. General Electric Co., 155 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1946); Unitd States Gypsum Co. v. Consolidated Expanded Metal Co.,
130 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 698 (1943); Lyon v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955).
16. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1952).
17. H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952); S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
18. Blish, Mize & Silliman Hardware Co. v. Time Saver Tools, Inc., 236 F.2d
913 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957); Stanley Works v. Rock-
well Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953).
19. 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955).
[Vol. 31
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soning, and have interpreted section 103 as setting a more lenient standard 0
Other courts have followed the theory that no change was meant by the 1952
Act, and that the "stricter" standard should apply.21
Against this background the Graham decision is of substantial importance in
several respects. First, the Court said that Congress meant to replace the less
definite term "invention" with "non-obviousness." This change was made in order
to clear up any interpretive differences courts had read into "invention." This will
affect many courts which had, even after the 1952 Act, continued to use "inven-
tion." 22 Some courts had even said: "[I~nvention is synonymous with unobvious-
ness."
23
Next, the Court said Congress intended to abolish the "flash of genius" test.2 4
The test, if it may be properly called such, arose from Cuno Engineering Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp.25 When that decision was announced there was wide
speculation whether it was another step in raising the standard of patentability.
After 1952, most courts recognized what Congress had done, and decided that even
if there was such a "flash of genius" test, it was thereby abolished.26 Other courts
which continued to use "flash of genius" after 195227 will now have to conform to
the majority.
The third thing the Supreme Court did in Graham was give the U. S. Patent
Office and its Examiners special consideration. The Court said the Commissioner
must follow the 1952 Act strictly, and give greater weight to the requirements of
20. Savoy Leather Mfg. Corp. v. Standard Brief Case Co., 261 F.2d 136 (2d
Cir. 1958); R. M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's Inc., 236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956);
Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Shelby Poultry Co., 293 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1961).
21. Even the Second Circuit may not be in complete agreement, see Zoomar,
Inc. v. Paillard Products, Inc., 258 F.2d 527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 908(1958); Welsh Mfg. Co. v. Sunware Products Co., 236 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1956).
For other decisions see: Hawley Products Co. v. United States Truck Co., Inc.,
259 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1958); Stabler v. Bright Leaf Indus., Inc., 261 F.2d 383 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 960 (1959). Bobertz v. General Motors Corp.,
228 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); Caldwell v. Kirk
Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); Aetna Steel
Products Corp. v. Southwest Products Co., 282 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 845 (1961).
22. Many courts have stated the three requirements for patent validity are
novelty, utility, and invention. See Warner & Swasey Co. v. Universal Marion
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 719 (D. Colo. 1964), aff'd. 354 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1965);
Ekstrom-Carlson & Co. v. Onsrud Mach. Works, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ill.
1961), aff'd. 298 F.2d 765 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962); Allied
Wheel Products v. Rude, 206 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1953); Hycon Mfg. Co. v. H.
Koch & Sons, 219 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955).
23. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d
406, 410 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964).
24. 383 U.S. at 15.
25. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
26. Fisch v. Gould, 246 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914
(1958); E. J. Brooks Co. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 266 F.2d 841, 843 n. 5 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 883 (1959); Emerson v. National Cylinder Gas Co., 251 F.2d
152 (1st Cir. 1958).
27. Blankenship v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 195 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Ark. 1961);
Chenault v. Nebraska Farm Products, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 772 (D. Neb. 1956).
1966]
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section 103. The Court felt this would accomplish two purposes. First, the large
backlog of patent applications would be reduced. Second, there would be a "closer
concurrence between administrative and judicial precedent. '28
Perhaps the most important thing the Court did in Gralm was setting up the
test and standard for patentability under section 103. It concluded section 103
was merely a codification of principles which had been around since Hotchkiss.
A long awaited answer came when the Court stated:
The standard has remained invariable in the Court. Technology, however,
has advanced and with remarkable rapidity in the last 50 years. Moreover,
the ambit of applicable art in given fields of science has widened by
disciplines unheard of a half-century ago. It is but an evenhanded appli-
cation to require those persons granted the benefit of a patent monopoly
be charged with an awareness of these changed conditions. The same is
true of the less technical, but still useful arts. He who seeks to build a bet-
ter mousetrap today has a long path to tread before reaching the Patent
Office. 29
The Court seems to be saying that Judge Hand was only partially correct in
the Lyon case. His opinion that the courts have been stricter on patents in the
last few years was correct. The reason, however, was not that the standard was
higher, but that technology had increased in the past few years, and more sub-
ject matter was obvious to one with "ordinary skill in the art." Also, the Court
makes it clear that the standard did not become more lenient in the 1952 Act.
The Court sets up guidelines to decide whether there is obviousness or non-
obviousness about the subject matter. These are in three divisions: (1) the scope
and content of the prior art; (2) differences between the prior art and the
claims; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art that applies to the claims
in question. Also secondary tests of long felt need, failure of others, and com-
mercial success may be used to help decide obviousness.30
This decision, which has been far too long in coming, is clear in its purpose
and objectives. The courts now know the effect of section 103 and the points to
stress in each factual situation. There will be problems in the future, but these
should be no harder than those with the reasonable man test which is applied
constantly by the courts.
The most questionable section of the opinion is the directive which the Court
gives the Patent Office. Since more patents are applied for and issued each year
than are litigated, this could be just as important, if not more so, as other parts
of the opinion.
The Court seems to make it clear that it wishes the Examiners to follow the
tests and standards set out in the opinion. There are, however, several problems
which arise in applying such tests and standards. The first is the secondary tests
which the Court recognizes. In a suit where invalidity is an issue, there will be
28. 383 U.S. at 19.
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 17.
[Vol. :31
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many facts on commercial success and long felt, but unsolved, needs presented
to the court. These facts normally will not be before the Examiner when he is
deciding if a patent should issue.
Another point which will give the Examiner problems is the question of "ordi-
nary skill in the art." It is true that the Examiners are divided into certain areas
and examine applications only in that area. It cannot be hoped, however, that
every Examiner will have "ordinary skill in the arte in every application he
examines. This could also work in reverse. An Examiner might become so expert
in an area that he would tend to be overly critical.
It is not contended that the Examiner cannot make some evaluation of "ordi-
nary skill in the art," but the Patent Office cannot come up to the same standard
as the courts.
The point of even trying to have the same standard for the Patent Office
as the courts may be questioned. Patent applications are cx parte proceedings,
rather than inter partes proceedings over which the court presides. This gives the
court a large advantage both in evidence and in expert testimony. Another factor
is the inventor himself. In many cases, the subject matter of the patent applica-
tion is untried, and the future success unknown. In these cases, the inventor
would be reluctant, or refuse, to go to the expense of applying if he had to meet
the same standard as in a court action.
For the future, this decision will have only a slight effect upon the Patent
Office and the issuance of patents. However, some patent applications will probably
be refused which would have been allowed prior to the Court's decision. These
will mainly be where the prior art is very close to the invention in the application.
Also, these patents, if issued, would contain only narrow patent claims,
and would have little commercial importance in most cases. Therefore, the change
will have little long-range consequence.
Those courts which have looked toward a more lenient standard since 1952
will have to reconsider their position. Courts which have been "strict" on patents
in the past will continue to be. The future of many patents in the courts might
well be stated in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the Jwngersen case: 31 "The
only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands
on.2
WILLIAM ROBERT COPE
31. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949).
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ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
State v. Rima'
On July 22, 1963, the Kansas City Star Credit Union was robbed by four men.
Larkins, driving north on Grand Avenue near the scene of the crime, observed
the four men getting into a 1962 Buick, and stopped his vehicle at the left rear
of the Buick just as the driver looked back toward him. At the trial, Larkins identi-
fied defendant, Rima, as the driver of the Buick, and testified that on the day of
the robbery he recognized a picture of defendant "in the mug books at the police
station."2 Although this statement was not a proper response to the question
asked, the defense failed to object or move that the answer be stricken. Larkins
also testified that he identified defendant in a police line-up on the evening of the
crime. The morning after Larkins had given his testimony concerning the prior
identification, the defendant moved for a mistrial. When the motion was over-
ruled, he asked that the jury be instructed "to disregard any testimony concern.
ing this photograph identification." 3 This request was also refused for the stated
reason that no objection had been made at the time of the testimony.
Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and sentenced to eight
years' imprisonment. On appeal, he alleged three errors by the trial court: (1)
failure to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) denial of the mo-
tion for mistrial; and, (3) improper instruction as to defendant's defense of alibi.
The Supreme Court en banc affirmed the conviction, holding that it was not error
for the trial court to refuse to declare a mistrial or instruct the jury to disregard
the testimony by Larkins concerning the prior identification of the photograph
of Rima. Defendant placed great emphasis on a 1927 case, State v. Baldwin,4
in which the Supreme Court en banc ruled that testimony by the prosecuting
witness about his prior identification of defendant's picture was irrelevant and
inadmissible. Such testimony was considered as evidence of a prior consistent
statement, and was therefore inadmissible because offered prior to any attempted
impeachment of the witness.5 Three years later in State v. Busckmano the court
approved the admission of testimony by a witness that he had recognized de-
fendant in a police line-up on the day following the crime. The Buschman court
attempted to distinguish Baldwin,7 stating that testimony given by the witness
about prior identification was competent for corroborative purposes. 8
In the noted case, the court overrules State v'. Baldwin, and indicates that the
1927 decision overlooked the fact that the testimony was not by one witness as to
1. 395 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
2. Id. at 104. This statement was made in reply to the question, "When
was it that you next saw him [the defendant]?"
3. Id. at 105.
4. 317 Mo. 759, 297 S.W. 10 (En Banc 1927).
5. Id. at 772, 297 S.W. at 15.
6. 325 Mo. 553, 29 S.W.2d 688 (1930).
7. Id. at 559, 29 S.W.2d at 691.
8. Id. at 560-61, 29 S.W.2d at 692.
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the prior identification by another. Rather it was the identifying witness, himself,
who testified as to prior identification. 9
[I~nsofar as State v. Baldwin holds that direct testimony of a witness that
he recognized a photograph of a defendant as a person he saw, at the com-
mission of the crime involved, was inadmissible it should no longer be fol-
lowed.10
There has long been a split in authority as to the admissibility of evidence of
extrajudicial identification, although more recent decisions have reflected the grow-
ing trend to consider such evidence as valuable and reasonably safe from such
objections as hearsay.11 The factors which may influence a court's decision con-
cerning the competency of such prior identification testimony are so numerous as
to preclude the probability of any single rule agreeable to all. 12 One factor, often
determinative, is whether the person who testifies as to the out-of-court identifica-
tion is the identifying witness or a third person who merely observed the identi-
fication being made. State v. Rima has clearly settled the Missouri conflict which
existed between the Baldwin decision and Busch'man as well as other subsequent
cases.' 3 Testimony about a prior identification by the witness who identifies a
defendant at the trial is competent. It is equally clear that Missouri has not crossed
the line into the area of prior identification testimony by a third party observer.14
The question which Rima leaves unanswered is: For what purposes is direct testi-
mony of prior identification admissible? It must necessarily be true that such testi-
mony is admissible regardless of any previous attempt at impeachment; for this is,
in effect, the holding in Rima. But quaere: Is the testimony merely corroborative
of the witness' identification at trial, or is it admissible as original or substantive
proof of the defendant's identity? In other words, what stand might we expect the
Missouri courts to take in each of the following situations?
1. The prosecuting witness testifies that the defendant is the man who
robbed him. The state then offers to have the witness testify that he made an
identification of the defendant by photograph or police line-up at a time shortly
after the robbery.
9. Although evidence of a prior identification is an exception, impliedly
recognized by the court in Rima, to the rule against admission of prior consistent
statements previous to attempted impeachment, there is an important distinction
to be drawn between direct and indirect testimony. See the discussion of this
distinction below.
10. Supra note 1, at 106.
11. People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 621, 626, 354 P.2d 865, 867 (1960); Judy v.
State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149,
155, 125 A.2d 442, 445 (1956); State v. Simmons, 63 Wash. 17, 20-21, 385 P.2d
389, 391 (1963); State v. Wilson, 38 Wash. 593, 617-18, 231 P.2d 288, 300 (1951).
12. Annots., 71 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960), 70 A.L.R. 910 (1931); 22 C.J.S. Crimi-
nal Law § 725 (1961); 20 AM. JUR. Evidence § 353 (1939).
13. State v. Robertson, 328 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1959); State v. Pitchford, 324
S.W.2d 684 (Mo. 1959); State v. Childers, 313 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1958); State v.
DePoortere, 303 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1957); State v. Nolan, 171 S.W.2d 653 (Mo.
1943).
14. The court in Rima was careful to point out that its decision related
only to direct testimony.
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2. The prosecuting witness is unable to testify whether defendant is the
culprit, but he is willing to testify that he identified the robber just after the
crime. 15
In situation 1, some courts would allow the prior identification testimony as
corroborative evidence;10 and it was admissible in State v. Rima for this purpose,
at the very least. If evidence of the previous identification is offered for the truth
of it, there is a hearsay problem. Clearly, the testimony in situation 2 would fall
in this area; yet some decisions have allowed the evidence,17 thus recognizing its
value and safety from the dangers of hearsay. It is a matter of common practice
for one or more witnesses to make some courtroom identification of a defendant,
but the worth of such testimony must necessarily be less than evidence of identi-
fication made according to standard police station procedures conducted shortly
after the crime was committed. The prior identification does not come after a
long lapse of time, or in the suggestive atmosphere of the courtroom where the
witness faces one man he knows is formally charged with the crime. Furthermore,
the hearsay objection has no firm basis, for the witness is available for cross-exami-
nation to test his memory, perception and sincerity. Finally, any distinction be-
tween the admission of the evidence for corroborative purposes, as opposed to sub,
stantive purposes, is so technical as to make it unrealistic to expect a jury to
heed a limiting instruction. Just as each juror will consider the witness' courtroom
identification, he will likewise decide as to the truth of the prior identification.
Direct testimony about prior identification should be admissble for substantive
purposes, the only real question being its weight.18
If we enter the area of third party testimony as to another person's prior
identification of the defendant, the arguments for admission break down. Should
the identifier be present or available to testify at trial, there is no necessity for
allowing someone else to present the evidence. If the declarant is not present or
available, then the hearsay dangers exist in full, since there can be no cross-
examination of the identifier to reveal a possible defect in his observation, recol-
lection, or sincerity. In spite of the dangers, at least one state has apparently de-
cided that the third party testimony is admissible for substantive, as well as cor-
roborative, purposes.19
15. If this testimony is admissible the problem arises as to how to connect
the testimony about prior identification of the robber with the defendant. Pre-
sumably the prosecution would follow a procedure similar to that used in State
v. Simmons, supra note 11, where photographs of a police line-up were introduced.
A witness identified the #1 man in the photograph both as one of the robbers,
and as the man he had picked out at the line-up; but he was unable to identify
defendant as being in the photographs. Several police officers then testified that
defendant was the #1 man in the photograph.
It should be noted that situation 2 closely resembles the circumstances under
which past recollection recorded is admitted.
16. U.S. v. Forzano, 190 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1951); Judy v. State, supra note 11,
17. State v. Simmons, supra note 11; People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 101
N.E.2d 457 (1951).
18. Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Ky. 1957).
19. Bullock v. State, 219 Md. 67, 74, 148 A.2d 433, 437 (1959).
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Direct testimony of prior identification as substantive evidence finds support
in the court decisions of California,20 Kentucky,21 Maryland,
22 Pennsylvania, 23
and Washington; 24 and at least two states, Ohio and New York, have enacted per-
missive legislation in this area.25 Whether by statute or court decision, it appears
only a matter of time before prior identification testimony is admitted as sub-
stantive proof in Missouri. We may be there now. Rims does not say.
DAvID K. HAmmY
VISITING RIGHTS OF A PUTATIVE FATHER
Commonwealth v. Rozanski'
The married petitioner sired an illegitimate child by the appellant. Although
he instituted divorce proceedings in order to marry the mother, intercession by a
priest led to reconciliation with his wife. While remaining faithful to his wife, he
visited and supported the bastard until, three years after birth, the mother denied
him access to the infant. She planned to marry and wished her future husband
to assume the role of father. Petitioner was granted visiting privileges. The
mother appealed, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania sustained the decision
below. In so doing, it explicitly overruled its holding in Commonwealth ex rel.
Golembewski v. Stanley, a precedent of only seven months' standing. The central
issue of both cases was whether a fit father, i.e., one suitable to undertake the
responsibilities of parenthood, could obtain visiting privileges, a limited form of
custody, with an infant bastard in the mother's custody. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, this note pertains only to situations where both parents are fit, and the
bastard is an infant.
Golembewski held: "As a matter of legal policy, it is detrimental to the wel-
fare of an illegitimate child in the mother's custody to award visitation privileges
to the putative father."2 Rozanski found this policy offensive to Pennsylvania's
primary standard governing custody of legitimates and illegitimates: the child's
best interest determines matters of custody. Since circumstances possibly could
20. People v. Gould, stpa note 11.
21. Supra note 18.
22. Judy v. State, sunpra note 11; Bullock v. State, supra note 19.
23. Commonwealth v. Saunders, supra note 11.
24. State v. Simmons, s&pra note 11; State v. Wilson, supra note 11.
25. The New York statute provides: "When identification of any person is
in issue, a witness who has on a previous occasion identified such person may testi-
fy to such previous identification." N.Y. CODE GRIM. PRoc. § 393-b (1957).
The Ohio legislation provides for third party testimony as well as direct. Oaio
REv. CODE § 2945.55 (1953).
1. 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965).
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exist where visitation, a limited form of custody,3 would promote welfare, it
should not be banned. Rozanski also applied to visitation the rule usually treated
as the best interest doctrine's corollary: what constitutes the best interest is to be
decided by the trial court based on its consideration of the circumstances. Since
the lower tribunal directly examined the circumstances, its judgement that visita-
tion promoted the child's welfare was conclusive, abuse of discretion being ab-
sent.4 Regarding the mother's marital plans, the superior court maintained they
were in the future and, therefore, uncertain. If fulfilled, the father then could be
replaced by her husband. In the meantime, the child needed a father image.5
According to early common law, the parish took custody of a bastard,
and the infant was considered parentless.6 The courts altered the rule by giving
the mother custody and allowing the father a better custodial claim than anyone
else if she died or abandoned their issue.7 Later universal adoption of the best in-
terest doctrine in bastardy cases raised the possibility of a father prevailing
against the mother, but this seldom has occurred.8 The courts have justified this
infrequency on two grounds. First, the father's parentage cannot be ascertained
as certainly as the mother's. Maternal custody, consequently, assures the infant
is with one parent.9 Second, the mother's natural ties of affection to the infant,
and vice versa, are stronger than those with the father. Therefore, maternal
tutelage offers the best prospects for the child's care and welfare.10 Only gross in-
difference to the child or highly immoral conduct by the mother have led the
courts to grant the father custody.11 If both parents are fit, ,the mother is made
custodian. Even a mother with the above unfavorable traits often is awarded
visiting privileges when the father is the predominant custodian due to the
judiciary's strong feeling about the mother and infant's natural ties.12 However,
when the mother obtains custody, it is usually exclusive.
3. See Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336, 205 P.2d 48 (1949); People
ex rel. Francois v. Ivanova, 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 221 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961); Bx
parte Hendrix, 186 Okla. 712, 100 P.2d 444 (1940).
4. See Francois v. Ivanova, supra note 3. According to the older rule, the
court of first instance's discretion was not subject to review. This is no longer the
case. See Strong v. Owens, supra note 3; Veach v. Veach, 195 P.2d 697 (Mont.
1948).
5. Commonwealth v. Rozanski, supra note 1 at 400, 213 A.2d at 158.
6. Homer v. Homer, 1 Hag. Con. 337, 351, 166 Eng. Rep. 573, 578 (Con-
sistory Ct. of London 1799).
7. E.g., Aycock v. Hampton, 84 Miss. 204, 36 So. 245 (1904); County of
Dodge v. Kemnitz, 32 Neb. 238, 49 N.W. 226 (1891).
8. In re McGraw, 228 N.C. 46, 44 S.E.2d 349 (1947); see Annot., 98
A.L.R.2d 431 (1964).
9. Wall v. Hardee, 240 N.C. 465, 82 S.E.2d 370 (1954).
10. Lipsey v. Battle, 80 Ark. 287, 97 S.W. 49 (1906); see Annots., 98
A.L.R.2d 427 (1964), 51 A.L.R. 1507 (1927).
11. :In re R.H.D.S., 370 S.W.2d 661 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); People ex rel.
Kessler v. Wehnert, 114 N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 1952); People ex rel. Meredith,
v. Meredith, 272 App. Div. 79, 69 N.Y.S.2d 462, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 692, 77 N.E.2d 8
(1947); People ex rel. Lewisohn v. Spear, 174 Misc. 178, 20 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1940);
Welsh v. Bagnall, [19441 Ont. 526, [19441 4 D.L.R. 439.
12. In re R.H.D.S., supra note 11; People ex rel. Kessler v. Wehnert, supra
note 11; People ex rel. Lewisohn v. Spear, supra note 11; Welsh v. Bagnall, supra
note 11; Allison v. Bryan, 26 Okla. 520, 109 Pac. 934 (1910).
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In a few jurisdictions, the father explicitly has been denied visitation; but
in these states, the exclusiveness has rested on statutes giving the mother custody
and control.13 Most cases merely restate the rule granting the mother custody,
and add that it is in the child's best interest when the mother is fit. No provision
is made for or against paternal visitation despite the father's professed interest
in the child. 14 Consequently, the effect of most decisions is contrary to Rozanski.
Only New York,x5 and possibly New Jersey,16 have reached the same conclusion
as Pennsylvania. The numerous decrees in other states where paternal visitation
has been awarded must be distinguished from the instant case, for in those other
jurisdictions the award has followed legitimation of the bastard.
Legitimation is a legislatively established process whereby, once the father
fulfills certain statutory conditions, the bastard's legal status becomes that of a
child born in wedlock. 17 While this definition must admit to many exceptions and
variations from state to state, it is valid in nearly all jurisdictions in the following
respects. First, the child is entitled to inherit from his father.' 8 Second, the fit
father can obtain visitation. Third, his permission becomes necessary before the
child can be adopted by third parties.19 In order to legitimate the child, many
states, including Missouri, minimally require the father marry the mother.20 Visita-
tion litigation is normally incident to divorce or separation proceedings. With the
exception of Pennsylvania and New York, no jurisdiction of this type has awarded
visitation without marriage to the mother.21 Many states, in addition to the
marital method, have provided for non-marital legitimation procedures. 22 These
13. E.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 60 Ill. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E.2d 24 (1965).
14. Lipsey v. Battle, supra note 10; Biakemore v. Blakemore, 217 Ga. 174,
121 S.E.2d 642 (1961); Dehler v. State, 22 Ind. App. 383, 53 N.E. 850 (1899);
Pratt v. Nitz, 48 Iowa 33 (1878); In re McGraw, supra note 8.
15. Francois v. Ivanova, supra note 3.
16. Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 85 Ati. 816 (1913).
17. See Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945) for discussion of
legislature's power to legitimate.
18. In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So. 2d 840 (1947); see Annot., 175
A.L.R. 375 (1948).
19. In re Adoption of a Minor, 155 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1946); In re McGrew,
183 Cal. 177, 190 Pac. 804 (1920); Chance v. Pigneguy, 212 Ky. 430, 279 S.W.
640 (1926); In re Anderson, 189 Minn. 85, 248 N.W. 657 (1933); In re Adoption
of Doe, 231 N.C. 1, 56 S.E.2d 8 (1949); Swartwood's Adoption, 19 Pa. Dist. 819
(1910); Sklaroff v. Stevens, 84 R.I. 1, 120 A.2d 694 (1956); Harmon v. D'Adamo,
195 Va. 125, 77 S.E.2d 318 (1953); In re Adoption and Change of Name of a
Minor, 191 Wash. 452, 71 P.2d 385 (1937).
20. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-103 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 795,
§ 45-274 (1958); GA. CODE § 74-101 (1963); ILL. Ruv. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1966);
§ 474.070 RSMo 1959; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:15-1 (1960); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 24;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 167 (1963).
21. Kilgore v. Tiller, 194 Ga. 527, 22 S.E.2d 150 (1942). See also Lipsey v.
Battle, supra note 14; Wallace v. Wallace, supraz note 13.
22. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 11 (1958); ALASKA STAT. tit. 25, ch. 20, § .050
(1965); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-103, § 12-631 (1956); CAL. Civ. CODE § 230;
COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-1-6 (1963); DEL. CODE § 1302 (1953); FLA. STAT. tit. 46,
§ 731.29 (1963); IDAHO CODE § 16-1504 (1947); IND. STAT. § 6-207 (1946); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ch 49, § 10 (1943).
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are designated by different terms in different states, e.g., adoption, legitimation, or
acknowledgement, and involve requirements varying from state to state. For
instance, in some jurisdictions the father must admit his paternity in writing,23
while in others a writing is not required.2 4 States providing for non-marital legiti-
mation consistently require legitimation before visitation will be awarded.25 Thus,
Pennsylvania and New York are alone in awarding it solely on the basis of best
interest, without the father's meeting the conditions, marital or non-marital, for
legitimation.
Rozanrki maintained New Jersey was in line with the New York view and con-
siderable reliance was placed by the superior court on a New Jersey decision,
Baker v. Baker.26 In that case, the father married the mother after birth, had
another child by her in wedlock, separated from her, and was granted visitation
with both children. Marriage was not then, though it is now, a method to legiti-
mate in New Jersy. Therefore, New Jersey's rule immediately after Baker was
that the father could obtain visitation with a bastard he had not legitimated.
However, for some time prior to Rozanski, a statute of that state had made the
mother sole custodian of a non-legitimated bastard, and specifically had denied
the father any privileges without her consent 27
In addition to this frail authority, the instant opinion has another weakness.
The superior court reasoned the father could inculcate certain desirable qualities
the mother could not, and would provide the child with a male figure. The prob-
ability the child would develop personal and emotional ties with the father under
the aegis of the decree was largely disregarded. 28 If the only legal device for
severance of these ties was a court finding they no longer were in the child's wel-
fare and that some other custodial arrangements had become preferable, Rozanski
would be on firmer ground. However, the relationship is also terminable by the
mother, regardless of best interest, on the basis of adoption statutes.
As in most jurisdictions,2 9 Pennsylvania's legislature has provided maternal
consent is the only parental permission necessary for adoption of bastards by
third parties.30 Also as in most jurisdictions, 8 adoption in Pennsylvania termi-
23. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 11 (1958).
24. CAL. Crv. CODE § 230.
25. See Bagwell v. Powell, 267 Ala. 19, 99 So. 2d 195 (1957); In re Heaton's
Estate, 135 Cal. 385, 67 Pac. 321 (1902); Ex parte Hendrix, supra note 3.
26. Supra note 16.
27. NJ. STAT. § 9:16-1 (1960).
28. Commonwealth v. Rozanski, supra note 1.
29. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. tit. 20, ch. 10, § .020 (1963); ARM. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-103 (1956); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224; COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-1-6 (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ch. 778, § 45-61 (1958); DEL. CODE § 907 (1953); FLA. STAT. tit. 6,
§ 72.14 (1963); GA. CODE § 74-403 (1963); IDAHO CODE § 16-1504 (1947); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1966); § 453.030 RSMo 1959; N.Y. DOM. REL. § 111. See
also 2 AM. JurL 2d Adoption §§ 25, 26 (1962). For states indicating father's con-
sent is necessary if his parentage is established in a paternity suit see ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 56-106 (1947); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-121 (1946).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 2 (1963).
31. E.g., Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 195 Atl. 306 (1937); See Annot., 114
A.L.R. 263 (1937). See also 2 AM. JUR. 2d Adoption § 85 (1962).
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nates whatever privileges a father of a legitimate child has.32 Adoption, a fortiori,
would conclude privileges of a putative father.33 Consequently, a mother can halt
the relationship by consenting to adoption either by her present or future hus-
band or by other third parties.
34
The Pennsylvania court cannot prevent this without disregarding either the
statutes by requiring paternal permission or the numerous decisions declaring
adoption terminates paternal privileges. Of course, if legitimation had been re-
quired in Rozanski, as it would be in most jurisdictions, this dilemma would not
arise since paternal permission becomes necessary before the court allows adop-
tion. Therefore, the instant opinion's interpretation of the best interest rule
allows courts of first instance to create circumstances in which the best interest
of the child would be judicially unprotectable. This would occur in the likely
event the father-child relationship developed, subsequent to the decree, into one
the termination of which would not be in the child's best interest. For this rea-
son, the decision is unsound.
RicHinD W. PMERSON
BANKRUPTCY-BANK MAY BE FORCED TO MAKE DOUBLE PAYMENT
UPON CHECKS DRAWN BY A VOLUNTARY BANKRUPT
Bank of Matin v. England'
Debtor drew five checks in favor of a creditor upon its account with the de-
fendant bank. The debtor then filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Six days
later, the creditor presented the checks to the bank for payment. The bank, hav-
ing no notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, paid the checks. The bankruptcy
trustee sought to require the bank to pay him the amount paid by the bank upon
the five checks. Both the referee in bankruptcy and the district judge ruled that
the bank was liable for this sum. The decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, holding, in effect, that a bank which honors checks without
notice that the drawer has filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy is liable to the
bankruptcy trustee for the amount paid.
Section 70(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act2 provides that the trustee in bank-
ruptcy shall be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of
the date the petition is filed, to any rights in action which prior to the filing of the
petition the bankrupt could by any means have transferred. The bankruptcy
trustee is vested thereby with a bankrupt depositor's claim against a bank as it
32. In re Adoption of Harvey, 375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276 (1953).
33. See Whetmore v. Fratello, 197 Ore. 396, 252 P.2d 1083 (1953). See also
Willey v. Lawton, 8 Ill. App. 2d 344, 132 N.E.2d 34 (1956).
34. See Whetmore v. Fratello, supra note 33.
1. 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965). Since this article went to press, the deci-
sion of the court of appeals was reversed by the Supreme Court. 87 S. Ct. 274
(1966).
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stood at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed. 3 This is by operation of
law and requires no action on the part of the trustee, the bank, or the depositor.
A bank can be placed in an awkward position by the operation of section 70(a)
(5). A petition in bankruptcy can be filed in any federal district court, and it
would be almost impossible for a bank to keep itself informed about the filing of
bankruptcy petitions in every competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, a bank has a
duty to its depositors to honor their validly drawn checks. So a bank might easily
honor a check after the title to that account has been vested in the trustee, and
have no way of knowing about the change in title. This gives rise to the question
whether a bank has any defense under the Bankruptcy Act to an action by the
trustee to recover an amount paid out of such an account.
Prior to 1938, no section in the Bankruptcy Act protected a transaction oc-
curing after the petition was filed. It was repeatedly announced that the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy was "a caveat to all the world, and in effect an attachment
and injunction." 4 However, the courts noted that where innocent parties were
concerned, the mere filing of the petition gave rise to no actual notice that would
put such persons on guard. In particular, it was held that a bank was not liable
to the trustee when in good faith, and in the ordinary course of business, it paid
checks drawn by a depositor against which, unknown to the bank, a petition in
bankruptcy had been filed.5
In 1938, section 70(d) was added to the Bankruptcy Act.6 It enumerates ex-
ceptions to the general rule of section 70(a) that the trustee in bankruptcy is
vested with the bankrupt's title as of the date the petition is filed. Section 70(d)
defines the full extent to which the courts may go in granting protection to a
transaction with the bankrupt after the petition has been filed.T
3. Section 70(a) originally provided that the trustee was vested with the
bankrupt's title as of the date of adjudication. However, the United States Supreme
Court held the trustee should be vested with the bankrupt's title as of the date
the petition in bankruptcy was filed. See Everette v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474, 478
(1913); Andrews v. Partridge, 228 U.S. 479 (1913); Fairbanks Shovel Co. v. Wills,
240 U.S. 642, 649 (1916); Acme Harvester v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300,
306 (1911). Section 70(a) was amended in 52 Stat. 879 (1938) to read that the
trustee would be vested with the bankrupt's title as of the date the petition was
filed.
4. Acme Harvester v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 306 (1911);
Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 14 (1902); In re Scranton Knitting Mills, Inc., 21
F. Supp. 227, 228 (N.D. Pa. 1937).
5. Citizens' Union Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527, 528 (6th Cir. 1923);
In re Zotti, 186 Fed. 84 (2d Cir. 1911); In re Retail Stores Delivery Corp., 11 F.
Supp. 658, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Stevens v. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 11 F.
Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). It should be noted that none of these cases afforded
protection to a bank which cashed checks drawn by a bankrupt depositor subse-
quent to the adjudication of bankruptcy. So these cases would not stand for the
proposition that a bank which cashes checks after a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy has been filed should be protected. This follows because the Bankruptcy
Act § 18(f), as amended, 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964), provides
that the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy shall act as an automatic ad-judication of bankruptcy.
6. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 110 (1964).
7. Section 70(d) (5) provides that "[except as otherwise provided in this
(Vol. 31
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There are two provisions in section 70(d) to which a bank might look for a
defense. The first is subsection 2, which provides that one indebted to the bank-
rupt can pay such indebtedness to the bankrupt or upon his order without liabil-
ity to the trustee; provided that he does so in good faith and at any time before
the adjudication of bankruptcy or before a receiver takes possession of the
property of the bankrupt, whichever first occurs. This provision will protect a bank
which pays a check in the interval between the filing of an involuntary petition
and the adjudication of bankruptcys but it will not protect a bank which pays a
check after a voluntary petition has been filed by the drawer.9 This is because
section 18(f)1o provides that the filing of a voluntary petition shall operate as an
automatic adjudication of bankruptcy.
The second provision to which a bank might look for a defense is the
"negotiability" proviso of section 70(d) (5).11 Rosental v. Guaranty Bank &
Trust Co.12 held that one of the purposes of this proviso was to protect a bank
which cashed checks in good faith subsequent to the adjudication of bankruptcy.
This was erroneous. The "negotiability" proviso states that nothing in the Bank-
ruptcy Act shall impair the negotiability of negotiable instruments. This would
protect a bank paying a check only if presentment and payment of the check con-
stitute a negotiation. It has been held that they do not.13
Accordingly, a bank which pays a check in good faith without notice that the
drawer has filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy will find no defense under the
Bankruptcy Act to an action by the trustee for recovery of the amount paid. This
is an absurd result. The bank is under a duty to honor the validly drawn checks
of its depositors until it receives a stop payment order. Furthermore, the bank
must act on the check within twenty-four hours.14 In order to exist in the mod-
em commercial community, the bank must perform this duty rapidly. Yet, under
the present state of the law, the only way a bank can protect itself against liability
to a trustee in bankruptcy in this situation is through the impossible course of
subdivision.... no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bank-
ruptcy shall be valid against the trustee." Courts have interpreted this to mean that
section 70(d) defines the full extent to which the courts may go in granting pro-
tection to transactions after the petition is filed. Lake v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 218
F.2d 394, 398 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955); See 4 COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY, 1 70.68(1), at 1503 (14th ed. 1964).
8. Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1961).
9. Ibid.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 18(f), as amended, 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11 U.S.C.
§ 41(f) (1964).
11. "Provided, however, That nothing in this title shall impair the negotiabil-
ity of currency or negotiable instruments." See statute cited note 7 supra.
12. 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).
13. Shammas v. Boyett, 114 Cal. App. 2d 139, 249 P.2d 880, 883 (1952);
Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Maron Nat'l Bank, 116 Ind. App. 453, 64 N.E.2d 583, 589
(1946); UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT § 963.
14. If the check is presented to the payee bank for payment it must be paid
by the close of business on the day of presentment. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-506. If the check is presented for deposit then the bank has until mid-
night of the day following presentment to make any final settlement. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-302.
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keeping itself constantly informed of the filing of voluntary petitions by its deposi-
tors in any competent jurisdiction.
An amendment to the Bankruptcy Act is needed providing another exception
to the rule of section 70(a). This should be that a trustee in bankruptcy can have
no cause of action against a bank for checks paid after the filing of a voluntary
petition unless the trustee has given the bank notice of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings prior to the time the checks were paid or unless the bank in some way had
knowledge of the proceedings.
BERNARD D. SIMON III
APPLICATION OF THE "LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE" RULE
TO THE BAD CHECK OFFENSES IN MISSOURI
State v. Friedman1
The trial court convicted the defendant, charged with the felony of having
given a check drawn upon a bank in which he knew he had no funds,2 of the
lesser offense of giving a check upon a bank, knowing he had insufficient funds in
or credit with such bank for payment of the check in full, a misdemeanor.2 The
basis for this finding was Missouri Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.01(c), which
states: "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in
the offense charged." The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the conviction,
holding that the offense under section 561.460 was not a "lesser included offense"
of section 561.450.
The test which the court applied in arriving at this result is one approved
by the Missouri Supreme Court in an earlier case.4 This test states that "[ilf the
greater of two offenses includes all the legal and factual elements of the lesser,
the greater includes the lesser; but if the lesser offense requires the inclusion of
some necessary element not so included in the greater offense, the lesser is not
necessarily included in the greater." 5 In applying this test, the court determined
1. 398 S.W.2d 37 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
2. Section 561.450, RSMo 1959. "Every person who, with the intent to
cheat and defraud, shall obtain or attempt to obtain, from any other person, or
persons, any money, property or valuable thing whatever ... by means of a check
drawn, with intent to cheat and defraud, on a bank in which the drawer of the
check knows he has no funds .. .shall be deemed guilty of a felony...."
3. Section 561.460, RSMo 1959. "Any person who, to procure any article
or thing of value or for the payment of any past due debt or other obligation of
whatsoever form or nature or who, for any other purpose shall make or draw
or utter or deliver, with intent to defraud any check, draft or order, for the pay-
ment of money, upon any bank or other depositary, knowing at the time of such
making, drawing, uttering or delivering, that the maker or drawer, has not
sufficient funds in or credit with, such bank or other depositary, for the payment
of such check, draft, or order, in full, upon its presentation, shall be guilty of
misdemeanor .... "
4. State v. Amsden, 299 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1957).
5. 27 AM. JUR. Indictments and Informations § 194 (1940).
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that the offense under section 561.460 is not necessarily an included lesser offense
of the crime under section 561.450 because of the statutory language. It concludes
that the phrase ". . . or credit with such bank," contained in section 561.460, con-
stitutes an element not included in the offense under section 561.450.
This decision indicates that some problems exist in Missouri in determining
if one offense is "necessarily included" in another. In applying the "statutory lan-
guage" test, the court is relying on State v. AmsdenA where the Missouri Supreme
Court applied the same test to determine if an offense under section 559.300, RSMo
1959 (carnal knowledge of an unmarried female of previously chaste character be-
tween the ages of sixteen and eighteen by a person over the age of seventeen),
was necessarily included in the offense charged under section 559.260 (forcibly
ravishing a woman over the age of sixteen). In holding it was not, the court
looked solely to the difference in elements of the two statutory definitions. By
this "statutory language" test the offense under section 559.300 would never be
included in an offense under section 559.260.
It is obvious, however, that the result based on the "statutory language" test
does not conform to the realities of the Amasden situation. As a practical matter,
it is impossible for a man to commit forcible rape on a girl between the ages of
sixteen and eighteen without also meeting the requirements of the lesser offense
specified in section 559.300. Assuming the State could have shown that the
prosecutrix was of previously chaste character, the commission of forcible rape
under these facts necessarily included the lesser offense of carnal knowledge be-
cause all of the legal and factual elements of both crimes were present. To satisfy
due process requirements, the information must put the defendant on notice that
he could be convicted of the lesser offense under section 559.300 without a show-
ing of lack of consent, which is an element of forcible rape, but not of carnal
knowledge.7 Such requirements can be determined from the accusatory pleading.
A more flexible test to determine when an offense is necessarily included is the
"accusatory pleading" test, which emphasizes the allegations of fact contained
in the indictment or information. The question of whether a crime is a necessarily
included offense is decided by looking at the allegations contained in the accusatory
pleading. A number of jurisdictions, including California 8 and New York, use this
test.9 Adoption of the accusatory pleading test by the Missouri courts would give
the courts more flexibility in determining when a crime is necessarily included in
the greater offense. It could result in the lesser offense in State v. Amsden being
necessarily included, since the facts in evidence apparently satisfy the elements
6. Supra note 4.
7. State v. Wells, 367 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1963).
8. 309 P.2d 456, 458 (Cal. 1957). The California Supreme Court discusses
the divergence and lack of clarity among many jurisdictions in deciding if an
offense is "necessarily included in a greater offense." The court applies the "accusa-
tory pleading" test to an information which charged robbery of an automobile,
and specifically pleaded but did not separately state the lesser offense of "tak-
ing an automobile." "Because the information charged defendant with taking 'an
automobile,' he was put on. notice that he would be prepared to defend against
a showing that he took that particular kind of personal property." Id. at 463.
9. Note, 16 U. FLA. L. R-v. 341, 342-343 (1963).
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of both crimes. By the more rigid "statutory language" test, however, the opposite
result occurs.' 0 This points up the weakness of the test currently applied by the
Missouri courts. With the "accusatory pleading" test the "lesser included offense"
question can be decided from the allegations of a particular indictment and the
facts shown at trial. This avoids frustrating efficient but just administration of the
criminal process by a mechanical application of an inflexible "rule of statutory ele-
ments." It would prevent the necessity of multiple indictments and multiple trials
of the same facts." Further, while use of the "accusatory pleading" test would
avoid the problems inherent in trying to determine if the greater offense includes
"all of the legal and factual elements of the lesser ... '12 it would seem to satisfy
the due process requirement that "the defendant ...be informed with reasonable
certainty whereof he is charged, so that the admissibility of evidence can be de-
termined, and so that, when the case is done, it will bar another prosecution for
the same offense." 13
Adoption of the "accusatory pleading" test in Missouri would be especially
helpful in the area of "no funds" and "insufficient funds" checks, which constitutes
a large part of the workload of the prosecutor's office and is covered by two dif-
ferent sections of the statutes. A typical problem with which the prosecuting at-
torney is faced under the "bad check" statutes is whether to bring the indictment
under section 561.450 ("no funds") or under section 561.460 ("insufficient funds").
Under the decision in the principal case, an acquittal of a charge under one sec-
tion may mean a new prosecution under the other section if the prosecutor has
failed to foresee the effect of his evidence. This involves additional expense and
inconvenience to both the defendant and the State. Further, a prosecutor who
thinks he will have difficulty getting a conviction of a "bad check" offender under
the felony section will tend to bring his information or indictment under the mis-
demeanor section as a matter of practical necessity. This will lead to a number
of offenders getting off with light punishments under the misdemeanor section when
they should have been convicted of the more serious charge. 14 These problems
10. Cf. People v. Marshall, supra note 8. "If a defendant were charged in
statutory language with assault 'with intent to commit murder' ([Cal.] PEN. CODE
sec. 217) and, separately, with assault with a deadly weapon' ([Cal.] PEN. CODE
sec. 245), the essential legal elements of neither offense charged would be 'neces-
sarily included' in the elements of the other (although both offenses charged
might in fact be committed by the same act and, hence, be subject to the provi-
sions of section 654 of the Penal Code); therefore, the term 'included offense,' as
used in the foregoing cases ...must refer to offenses included in the language of
the pleading, not to offenses necessarily included in the language of the statutes."
11. State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188, 194 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
12. Supra note 1, at 40.
13. Supra note 11. Mo. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 18(a), 19; Mo. R. CRIM. P. 24.01.
Cf. People v. Hess, 45 Cal.2d 171, 175, 288 P.2d 5 (1955), cited with approval in
People v. Marshall, supra note 8, at 461 n.6. 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations
§ 130 (1944).
14. Another serious problem, outside the scope of this note, is the use of the
Prosecutor's office as a "collection agency" for bad checks. It is suggested that if
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would seem to be greatly alleviated by use of the "accusatory pleading" test which
looks to the pleading to determine not only whether it informs the defendant "with
reasonable certainty whereof he is charged," but also whether it defines the crime
"with sufficient particularity so as to enable the defendant to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause."'1
In the Friedman case, the St. Louis court recognizes that "it is true that the
gravamen of both offenses is the intent to cheat and defraud." 16 The court also
recognizes that ". . . it would seem obvious that a drawer who knows that he
has no funds in the bank when he issues a check must of necessity know that his
funds therein are insufficient to pay the same in full."' 7 The court then applies the
statutory language test and concludes that the offense under section 561A60 is
not necessarily included in the greater offense under section 561.450 because, "[ijn
this case the necessary element which is included in section 561.460, and which
is not included under section 561.450, is to be found in the words '. . . or credit
with, such bank,' which form a part of the former." The court rules that an
acceptable charge under section 561.460 must allege not only that the drawer
knew that he had insufficient funds in the bank, but also that he knew that he
had no credit with such bank for the payment of the check in full. An allegation
that one, with intent to defraud, gave a check upon a bank knowing he had no
funds, which according to the court also alleges that he "must of necessity know
that his funds therein are insufficient to pay the same in full,"' 8 renders superfluous
an allegation that he also knew he had not sufficient credit with the bank in order
to get an instruction on the lesser offense under section 561.460. L The court does
not consider that "intent to cheat and defraud" is an element of both crimes, and
was alleged in the information, and that credit with the bank would negative this
intent under a charge based upon either section. Therefore, the element of "lack of
credit" hardly seems a sufficient basis for holding that a violation of section
561.450 does not include a violation of section 561A60. This is because one who has
"intent to cheat and defraud" when he writes a check knowing he has no funds
in the bank must know he has insufficient credit with the bank as well as in-
sufficient funds "for payment of the check in full." The words "or credit with"
appear to be excess verbiage in section 561A60, in view of the inclusion of "intent
to cheat and defraud," which is a necessary element of the crime. This is further
indicated by the definition of "no funds" offense by section 561.450, in which lack
of credit with the bank is not mentioned while "intent to cheat and defraud" is.
15. Note, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 93, 95 (1957); Hagner v. United States, 285
U.S. 427 (1931). On the problem of a second jeopardy for the same offense, see
generally Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, sec. 19; State v. Hamlin, 171 S.W.2d 714 (Mo.
1943); State v. Bowles, 360 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Mo. 1962); Miller, The Plea of
Double Jeopardy in Missouri, 22 Mo. L. REv. 162 (1957).
16. Supra note 1, at 39.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Supra note 10. "One of the tests of sufficiency of facts stated in an in-
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A showing of "credit with" the bank for payment of the check in full would be a
good defense to a charge of either offense. The Missouri courts can look to the
accusatory pleading to determine if an offense is necessarily included in the one
charged, and achieve results based upon the particular case before them rather
than a fixed statutory definition.
Does the fact that the drawer's knowledge of his lack of credit was not
pleaded by the prosecutor in this case deprive the defendant of due process of
law?2 0 It is doubtful that a defendant charged with the crime in the principal
case would be "taken by surprise" by evidence tending to show "insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank for payment of the check in full." The defense of
credit as defined in section 561.48021 clearly would be available to the defendant
as a good defense to either the felony charge under section 561.450 or a charge
under section 561.460. Failure to plead lack of credit would not create any danger
of surprise under due process concepts. Only by a rigid application of the "statutory
language" test is the result of the principal case reached 2 2 While the "insufficient
funds" offense is not an included offense under section 561.450 by the statutory
language yardstick, it is under the accusatory pleading test. After transfer of de-
fendant's appeal to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the prosecuting attorney did
not enter his appearance, file a brief, or participate in the hearing, so presumably
no arguments against the test applied were presented to the court.
An alternative solution would lie in revision of our statutes. Our present
"bad check" laws could be improved by passage of a law similar to that passed in
Oklahoma last year.2 3 A revised statute taking the present "no funds" check
offense out of the "confidence game or fraudulent checks" section and incorporat-
ing it with the offense under section 561A60 would simplify prosecutions in this
area. Under such a "graded" offense statute, the lesser included offense and dou-
ble jeopardy difficulties would be eliminated, regardless of the test used. The
Oklahoma statutes base the distinction between felony and misdemeanor upon
the value of the property obtained and upon prior convictions for bogus checks.2 4
These are other factors often used to determine if a lesser offense is necessarily
included in a greater offense. The "accusatory pleading" test could be effectively
applied to cases arising under such a statute. The distinction between a "no funds"
check and an "insufficient funds" check could be either retained or resolved by
emphasizing the intent "to cheat and defraud." The provisions of section 561.470,25
20. Supra note 13.
21. "The word 'credit' as used in sections 561A60 to 561.480 shall be con-
strued to mean an arrangement or understanding with the bank or depositary, for
the payment of such check, draft or order. (R.S. 1939, sec. 4697)."
22. State v. Perkins, 380 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Mo. 1964).
23. OKLA. SEss. LAWS 1965, ch. 216.
24. Note, 3 TULSA L.J. 53, 55 (1966).
25. "As against the maker or drawer thereof, the making, drawing, uttering
or delivering of a check, draft or order, payment of which is refused by the
drawee, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud and of knowledge of in-
sufficient funds in or credit with, such bank or other depositary, provided such
maker or drawer shall not have paid the drawee thereof the amount due thereon,
together with all costs and protest fees, within ten days after receiving notice that
such check, draft or order has not been paid by the drawee. As amended Laws
1963, p. 684, sec. 1." Sec. 561.470, RSMo 1963 Supp.
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making failure to pay the check within a specified time prima face evidence of
intent to cheat and defraud, could be incorporated in such a statute. An addi-
tional advantage would be the more effective sanction against chronic offenders,
who are frequently inadequately punished under our present system.
The burden on the prosecutor's office created by the multitudinous "bad
check" offenses is a very real one. It is submitted that either adoption of the
"accusatory pleading" test or revision of our statutes would cure the present de-
ficiencies in this area.
RONALD C. SPRADLEY
DUE PROCESS: FTC COMMISSIONERS DISQUALIFIED AFTER SENATE
PROBES MENTAL PROCESSES
Pillsbury Co. v. FTC1
In 1952 the government filed a complaint against Pillsbury alleging viola-
tions of the Clayton Acet's anti-monopoly provision. In 1955 Federal Trade Com-
mission Chairman Howrey testified before the Senate antitrust subcommittee, ac-
companied by three men who would, as Commissioners, participate in the four-
man 1960 Pillsbury decision. Senators who felt that the FTC should find against
Pillsbury, as it ultimately did, questioned Howrey and his associates extensively
regarding the Commission's approach in the Pillsbury case. During the Senate
hearings, the Pillsbury case was pending before the FTC hearing examiner. Be-
cause Congress had probed so deeply into his mental processes as a quasi-judicial
officer, Chairman Howrey disqualified himself from participating in the decision.
But the court in the instant case invalidated the Commission's order because
procedural due process "required at least some of the members in addition to the
chairman to disqualify themselves."
A fair trial is not a mere statutory right completely subject to legislative
whim. The basic necessity for a fair hearing is that imposed as a minimal require-
ment by the due process of law clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution. 2 Though adherence to strictly judicial standards varies with the
type of proceeding involved,3 the basic due process requirement binds administra-
tive agencies as well as courts.4 A fair hearing is the "inexorable safeguard" 5
1. 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
2. R.R. Comm'n. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 393 (1938);
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292, 304-05 (1937); Philadelphia
Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd, other grounds, 337 U.S. 901
(1949). See CHAMBERLAIN, DOWLING & HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCrION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 193-207 (1942). The statute governing administrative
hearings is the Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 5-10, 60 Stat. 239-43 (1946), 5
U.s.C. §§ 1004-09 (1964).
3. Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
4. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, supra note 2; Kline v. United States, 41 F. Supp.
577, 583 (D. Neb. 1941).
5. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 15 (1938).
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guaranteeing the parties in a quasi-judicial proceeding at least that fundamental
fairness which is the essence of due process. 6 Administrative adjudication must be
the decision of an impartial tribunal after a full and open hearing at which the
parties are entitled to notice and the right to be heard.7 Failure to observe these
requirements invalidates the proceedings and renders the decision void or
voidable.8
One factor vitiating the proceedings is participation in the decision by a dis-
qualified judicial officer. Due to common law, statutory, or constitutional due
process requirements,9 judges have long been subject to disqualification for pe-
cuniary interest, kinship, personal bias or prejudice, and prejudgment of the case.
Courts early held that quasi-judicial officers were also subject to disqualification' 0
and tended to apply the same rules as they had applied to judges."1
Two often-cited decisions disqualified officials for bias12 and for pecuniary in-
terest.13 More in point with the instant case are decisions dealing with a prior
public expression of views by a quasi-judicial officer which implies prejudgment
of the case and sacrifices the appearance of impartiality. One court refused to dis-
qualify a quasi-judicial officer who wrote that since he knew the case so well,
there was no need of a hearing.14 The Supreme Court declined to disqualify a
Cabinet officer who had vigorously criticized the second Morgan decision in a
letter to the New York Times.' 5 Again the high court would not disqualify Fed-
6. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Morgan v. United States,
supra note 5, at 19.
7. R.R. Comm'n. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 2; St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (Brandeis, concurring opinion).
8. ICC v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC,
336 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 953,
956 (8th Cir. 1939). See 1 AM. JUR.2d Administrative Law § 68 (1962).
9. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 532 (1927).
10. State ex rel. Miller v. Aldridge, 212 Ala. 660-62, 103 So. 835-36 (1925).
11. Notes, Disqualification of Administrative Officials for Bias, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 712 (1960).
12. State ex rel. Miller v. Aldridge, supra note 10.
13. "Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge . .. not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state
and the accused denies the latter due process of law." Tumey v. Ohio, supra note 9,
at 532. More recently the courts have indicated ambiguous concern for the due
process implications of commingling the prosecuting and the adjudicating functions.
See It re Murchison, supra note 6, 44 CALIF. L. Ruv. 425 (1956); SEC v. R. A.
Holman & Co., 323 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, supra
note 3, at 266-67, Law, Disqualification of SEC Commissioners Appointed from the
Staff: Amos Treat, R. A. Holman, And the Threat to Expertise, 49 CORNELL L.Q.
257 (1964), 51 GEO. L.J. 186 (1962), 76 HARv. L. Rv. 831 (1963).
14. "However tactless or undesirable such remarks may have been, they fell
short of a statement that nothing that might be shown at such a hearing would
change his mind." Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Locke, 60 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir.
1932).
15. "Cabinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions are
not assumed to be flabby creatures any more than judges are. Both may have an
underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case. Both are assumed to be men
of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular contro-
versy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances." United States v. Morgan,
313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
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eral Trade Commissioners who had expressed firm views on the illegality of a cer-
tain practice in reports to Congress and the President and in testimony before
Congress.' 6 Twice courts who did not disqualify the officer indicated their dis-
pleasure. In the Brownell case the Attorney General had publically condemned an
organization about which he would later have to make a quasi-judicial determina-
tion.17 In the Gilligan case the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an un-
favorable press release in similar circumstances.18 But in the recent Texaco case,
the court disqualified FTC Chairman Dixon on due process grounds for delivering
a speech charging Texaco with illegal practices before participating in the FTC
Texaco decision.' 9
The instant case is unusual in that here the prior expression of views occurred
during a probe of the officials' mental processes. High federal courts early took
it for granted that it was wholly improper for a court to probe the mental
processes of a judge,20 quasi-judicial officer 2' or board.22 The classic statement of
this policy appears in the fourth Morgan decision.
The Secretary should never have been subjected to this examination. The
proceeding before the Secretary "has a quality resembling that of a
judicial proceeding." Such an examination of a judge would be destructive of
judicial responsibility. We have explicitly held in this very litigation that
"it was not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the
Secretary." Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny, so the
integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected.2 3
Numerous federal decisions reiterate this principle.24
One line of cases, however, maintains that judicial review opens all questions
16. "The fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result
of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of
its members were irrevocably closed on the subject. . . . Judges frequently try the
same case more than once and decide identical issues each time, although these
issues involve questions both of law and of fact." FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 683, 701, 703 (1948).
17. Nat'l. Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
18. ".... the Commission's reputation for objectivity and impartiality is opened
to challenge by the adoption of a procedure from which a disinterested observer
may conclude that it has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law
of a particular case in advance of hearing it." Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267
F.2d 461, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1959) (dictum).
19. Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 8.
20. Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 216, 306-07 (1904).
21. United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80, 86 (1907); DeCam-
bra v. Rogers, 189 U.S. 119, 122 (1903).
22. "The essence of the discussion of a common cause and the judgment en-
suing upon that discussion must lie in freedom of expression . . . The logic of
this position requires the preservation from questioning of each member of the
general body." NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F.2d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 1939).
23. United States v. Morgan, supra note 15, at 422 (citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 229 (1947);
NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39, 48 (3d Cir. 1942); NLRB v.
Air Associates, Inc., 121 F.2d 586, 591 (2d Cir. 1941); Bethlehem Shipbuilding
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relating to the regularity of the administrative board's proceedings. Although
most courts, relying on the presumption of administrative regularity, declined to
compel the board to answer interrogatories regarding its manner of considering
the case, they nevertheless stoutly upheld their power to do so 2 5 One court did
order the board to answer such interrogatories. 2 6 The value of these decisions as
authority is minimized, however, by the fact that all occurred between the first
and fourth Morgan decisions. In the first Morgan case, the Supreme Court im-
plied that courts could probe the decisional processes of a Cabinet officer, but re-
treated from this position in the second decision, and crystallized its anti-probing
policy in the fourth Morgan case.27
The instant case combines the two traditional classes of cases discussed above.
The anti-probing decisions deal with probing after the officer's decision. But the
disqualification cases concern an official's expression of views on the case prior to
his decision. The Pillsbury case prohibits probing of mental processes, which is
usually done to preserve the integrity of decisions already rendered; but the de-
cision's rationale is that of the disqualification cases: to assure litigants an im-
partial tribunal which has not prejudged a case still pending. Thus these two
classes of cases coalesce in Pillsbury, where officials were disqualified because their
mental processes had been probed.
Another feature complicating the case is that it concerns, not the typical
judicial probing of a judicial decision, but congressional probing of an administra-
tive decision. Courts wish to give administrative adjudications the anti-probing
protection enjoyed by judicial determinations. Administrative efficiency also de-
mands that officials be spared the harassment, political pressure, and loss of time
entailed in probing their decisions. Nor are courts insensitive to litigants' right to a
fair hearing by an impartial tribunal, as required by constitutional and statutory
due process provisions 28 To maintain public confidence in the soundness of ad-
ministrative adjudication," "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."80
Nevertheless there are strongly conflicting policy considerations. Even judges
are not perfectly neutral adjudicating machines. Quasi-judicial officers have the
additional responsibility of making agency policy and informing the public.3 '
Chosen for their sympathy with agency aims, they often have firm convictions
25. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 105 F.2d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1939);
Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. NLRB, supra note 8; NLRB v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co.,
98 F.2d 16, 17 (9th Cir. 1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
47 (1937).
26. NLRB v. Cherry Cotton Mills, 98 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1938).
27. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 482 (1936); Morgan v. United
States, supra note 5, at 18; United States v. Morgan, supra note 15, at 422. See
ScHwARTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATiVE LAW 141-48 (1958).
28. See cases and statute cited note 2, supra.
29. Morgan v. United States, supra note 5.
30. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Amos Treat & Co., supra
note 3, at 267.
31. Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication 74 YALE L.J. 652 (1965).
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about protecting the sector of the public interest assigned to their agency.3 2
Naturally this tends to conflict with the desire for impartial quasi-judicial officers
without prior opinions amounting to prejudgment of the case.33 Furthermore, con-
gressional committees are charged with overseeing administrative agencies.34 Con-
gress cannot decide intelligently on statutory changes regarding an agency with-
out examining its past performance. Thus the due process argument is not a com-
pelling as it might seem at first, because of the delicate, dual role of the quasi-
judicial officer and because of Congress's duty to oversee administrative agencies.
Hence courts have been quicker to criticize such officers than to disqualify them.
But these considerations do not justify the infringement of due process which oc-
curred in the Pillsbury case. Therefore the instant case sets salutary limits which
both the prudent administrator and the legislator would do well to observe. Here
the court held that for Congress to probe extensively the mental processes of
quasi-judicial officers regarding a pending case was not legitimate supervision of
the agency's legislative function, but interference with its judicial function, de-
priving the litigants of due process of law.
JOHN R. TRUMAN
32. It was partly to secure this "bias" that adjudication in these areas was
entrusted by Congress to administrative agencies instead of to the courts. See 2
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 135 (1958).
33. Of course officials may have definite policy views without prejudging
the facts of a particular case. For a vigorous argument against the "neutral" officer,
see FTC Chairman Dixon's article, "Disqualificatio7" of Regulatory Agency Mem-
bers: The New Challenge to the Administrative Process 25 FED. B.J. 273 (1965).
See also Comment, Prejudice and the Administrative Process 59 Nw. U. L. REv.
216 (1964). There is the added problem that if agency officers disqualify them-
selves, there may be no one legally competent to make a determination. This
doctrine of "necessity" was relied on heavily in FTC v. Cement Institute, supra
note 16, at 701 where the court observed that: "Had the entire membership of
the Commission disqualified itself ... this complaint could not have been acted
upon by the Commission or by any other government agency. Congress has pro-
vided for no such contingency. It has not directed that the Commission disqualify
itself under any circumstances, has not provided for substitute commissioners should
any of its members disqualify, and has not authorized any other government agency
to hold hearings ... ." On necessity see Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1476 (1925).
34. Broden, Legislative and Executive Oversight of the Administrative
Process 26 ICC PAc. J. 768 (1959). See Newman & Keaton, Congress and the
Faithful Execution of the Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators? 41
CALIF. L. REv. 565 (1953-54); Report on Congressional Oversight of Administra-
tive Agencies of the Committee of Administrative Law of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, 5 REcoED ABNYC 11 (1950).
1966]
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [1966], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss4/6
